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SAVE TARA AND THE MODERN STATE
OF THE CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
Todd Nelson*
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires public
review of all public and private projects that are subject to a public
agency’s approval. Unlike many other states’ environmental laws,
CEQA requires that projects that create significant environmental
impacts not be approved if feasible mitigation measures or project
alternatives exist that would reduce or eliminate those impacts.
However, although CEQA was adopted more than forty years ago and
has been the subject of approximately six hundred published decisions,
there remains much uncertainty as to what agencies and project
proponents must do to comply with CEQA and avoid judicial reversal.
One of the most critical contested issues is the question of what
constitutes a project for purposes of requiring CEQA analysis. This
uncertainty was at the heart of Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood, a
recent California Supreme Court case that set forth a new, flexible test
for determining what actions by public agencies will constitute a CEQA
project. This Note describes the current state of CEQA following Save
Tara, identifies the decision’s costly impacts on previously exempt
public-agency activities, offers suggested legislative reforms to the
existing law, and suggests best practices for project proponents and
public agencies that seek to comply with CEQA while avoiding
frivolous lawsuits.

* J.D. Candidate, December 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., University of
California, Los Angeles; A.B., Brown University. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Selmi
for his guidance and support during the writing of this article, and the members of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their valuable editorial input. Also, thank you to Lisa, for all of your
support and encouragement, and to Maggie, for learning to sleep through the night.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The California legislature adopted the California Environmental
Quality Act1 (CEQA) in 1970 following the federal government’s
adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act2 (NEPA) in 1969.
Like NEPA, CEQA requires public agencies to review and take into
account the environmental impacts of their actions.3 However, unlike
NEPA, CEQA contains a substantive mandate that prohibits public
agencies from approving public or private projects with significant
environmental impacts if there are feasible mitigation measures or
project alternatives that would lessen or eliminate those impacts.4
Accordingly, California agencies, when deciding to undertake or
approve a project,5 must conduct environmental review and certify an
environmental analysis ensuring that these impacts have been
eliminated or mitigated to a level of insignificance.6

1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2007).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(f) (2006).
3. PUB. RES. § 21000; Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1054–55
(Cal. 1972); Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Development of the State Environmental Policy Acts,
38 URB. LAW. 949, 982 (2006).
4. PUB. RES. §§ 21002, 21081; Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 939 P.2d
1280, 1298 (Cal. 1997).
5. CEQA defines a project as:
[A]n activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a
reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any
of the following:
(a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency.
(b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part, through
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public
agencies.
(c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
PUB. RES. § 21065. As this Note describes, this definition, as well as the state’s CEQA
guidelines’ definition of project, has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation.
6. Mitigation of environmental impacts might include avoiding a proposed action
altogether, limiting the degree of a proposed action, rectifying the impact of the action, or
compensating for the impact of the action. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15370 (2011). Note that
CEQA only requires mitigation measures that are feasible, and a project that creates significant
and unavoidable impacts may still be approved if the approving agency makes certain required
findings and adopts a “statement of overriding considerations.” PUB. RES. § 21081; tit. 14,
§ 15091.
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In its forty years of existence, CEQA’s statutory requirements
and accompanying regulatory guidelines7 have produced an
environmental review process where members of the public interact
with public agencies to ensure that these agencies are fully informed
of the potential environmental effects of their decisions.8
Unsurprisingly, given CEQA’s tremendous reach into so many of the
decisions that public agencies make, an enormous cadre of
consultants, lawyers, development advocates, and environmentalists
specializing in CEQA analysis has developed. To date, CEQA is the
subject of approximately six hundred published judicial decisions,9
which have further defined the reach and limits of the original
statute, and have exposed some of CEQA’s inherent tensions. Many
project opponents continue to complain that the environmental
protections that CEQA has promised do not go far enough.10 On the
other side, project advocates and sponsors often complain that the
balancing of environmental and other public needs that CEQA has
contemplated has been ignored, and that the statute has become an
effective tool to oppose projects for reasons other than environmental
concerns.11
Despite numerous California appellate and supreme court
CEQA decisions, there remains a great deal of uncertainty in the law
regarding what agencies need to do to comply with CEQA to prevent
judicial reversal.12 This uncertainty may create significant costs for
agencies, as CEQA challenges have become an effective tool to
block projects that opponents deem undesirable, even if the reasons
for their opposition are seemingly unrelated to environmental
7. California first adopted statewide CEQA guidelines in 1973 pursuant to the authority
granted in Public Resources Code section 21083. The guidelines are prepared by the Governor’s
Office of Planning and Research and are written to encompass both the specific statutory
requirements of CEQA and judicial interpretations of the statutory language. The procedures that
public agencies adopt to implement CEQA must be consistent with these guidelines. PUB. RES.
§§ 21082, 21083; MICHAEL H. REMY ET AL., GUIDE TO CEQA 6–7 (11th ed. 2007). The CEQA
Guidelines appear as title 14, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations. CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 14, §§ 15000–15387 (2011).
8. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 282–
83 (Cal. 1988).
9. Lisabeth D. Rothman, CEQA Turns 40: The More Things Change, the More They
Remain the Same, ST. B. CAL. ENVTL. L. NEWS, Winter 2011, at 2, available at http://
www.bhfs.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-2301-19708/pdfCopy.name=/LA.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
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impacts.13 To defend against such challenges, environmental impact
reports (EIRs) and the supporting environmental analyses that public
agencies produce continue to lengthen as agencies and project
applicants attempt to provide more detail to create defensible
documents.14 Longer EIRs take more resources and time to draft and
review, which increases the amount of time a project proponent must
wait until an agency approves a final EIR.15 Finally, project
proponents often pay the agency’s costs for preparing an EIR and for
litigation.16
This Note examines Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood,17 a
significant recent California Supreme Court decision dealing with a
threshold question under CEQA—namely, what constitutes a project
for purposes of requiring CEQA analysis? In answering this
question, the court in Save Tara set forth a flexible and open-ended
standard that has expanded CEQA’s reach to potentially include
previously exempt public agency activities. This Note argues that the
Save Tara decision has exceeded the reasonable scope of CEQA’s
statutory language and requires a legislative remedy to ensure that
this decision does not inordinately burden public agencies and
private project applicants.
Part II provides an overview of CEQA’s purposes, policies, and
mechanisms, and it introduces some of the tensions that are inherent
in this law. Part III first reviews several important recent decisions
regarding the definition of a project under CEQA and then closely
examines the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Save Tara decision.
Part IV looks at the ramifications of Save Tara and its effects on the
actions of public agencies. Finally, Part V proposes remedies that the
California legislature and public agencies should pursue in order to
fix the impacts of Save Tara.

13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 13. Private sector proponents must pay the carrying costs of holding their property
as they await approval of their projects, while delays in public projects can hinder bond financing
and lead to increased costs through rate increases. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008).

294

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:289

II. OVERVIEW OF
CEQA AND ITS SCOPE
A. Purposes of CEQA
CEQA is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to
provide long-term protection to California’s environment.18 As the
statutory language sets forth, the California legislature found and
declared that it is the state’s policy to “[d]evelop and maintain a
high-quality environment now and in the future, and take all action
necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental
quality of the state.”19 Other closely related policies include
providing Californians with clean air and water, enjoyment of
aesthetic, scenic and historical environmental qualities, and freedom
from excessive noise;20 preserving fish and wildlife;21 and requiring
government agencies to develop standards and procedures to protect
the environment.22 In addition to these clear goals, the statutory
language includes more complicated statements that may reveal a
policy tension at the heart of CEQA. For example, CEQA includes
statements of purpose that emphasize the importance of meeting
residents’ housing needs, which may directly conflict with the typical
environmental protections that CEQA also embodies.23 As this
example indicates, the drafters of CEQA contemplated the need to
balance efforts to protect the environment with other practical
considerations that California residents face.24 The California courts
have also attempted to balance these competing goals, and CEQA’s

18. Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 939 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Cal. 1997).
19. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(a) (West 2007).
20. Id. § 21001(b).
21. Id. § 21001(c).
22. Id. § 21001(f).
23. The statutory language of CEQA states:
[A]ll agencies of the state government which regulate activities of private individuals,
corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the quality of the
environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to
preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living
environment for every Californian.
Id. § 21000(g) (emphasis added). Furthermore, another stated policy of CEQA is to “[e]nsure that
the long-term protection of the environment, consistent with the provision of a decent home and
suitable living environment for every Californian, shall be the guiding criterion in public
decisions.” Id. § 21001(d) (emphasis added).
24. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
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extensive litigation history has produced the statute’s predominant
interpretive principle.
B. Interpreting CEQA
The California Supreme Court first interpreted CEQA’s
statutory framework in 1972 in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors.25 There, the court held that CEQA should be interpreted
so as to afford “the fullest possible protection to the environment
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”26 This
holding—requiring the broad construction of CEQA’s substantive
and procedural requirements while simultaneously limiting that
construction to what can be reasonably inferred from the text of the
statute—captures the interpretive principle that has come to
characterize CEQA analysis.27 As an indication of the importance of
this judicial principle, the Friends of Mammoth holding has been
incorporated into the CEQA Guidelines’ “Policies” section.28
Other indications of tension between the broad application of
CEQA and a more limited interpretation of its applicability exist in
the statutory language. For example, Section 21003(f) of the
California Public Resources Code requires that:
All persons and public agencies involved in the
environmental review process be responsible for carrying
out the process in the most efficient, expeditious manner in
order to conserve the available financial, governmental,
physical, and social resources with the objective that those
resources may be better applied toward the mitigation of
actual significant effects on the environment.29

25. 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
26. Id. at 1056.
27. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
28. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003(f) (2011). Other relevant court cases that speak to this
inherent tension in CEQA are Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the University of
California, 864 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1993) and Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 801
P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990), which together provide the policy listed under title 14, section 15003(j) of
the California Code of Regulations (“CEQA requires that decisions be informed and balanced. It
must not be subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic, or
recreational development or advancement.”).
29. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003(f) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
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Additionally, section 21083.1 states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that courts, consistent with
generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation, shall not
interpret this division or the state guidelines adopted
pursuant to Section 21083 in a manner which imposes
procedural or substantive requirements beyond those
explicitly stated in this division or in the state guidelines.30
Thus, Friends of Mammoth’s holding that CEQA be broadly
construed to protect the environment is limited by any CEQA
provision or adopted state CEQA guideline that explicitly restricts
CEQA’s breadth or requires the consideration of the economic costs
of CEQA compliance.31
C. Procedures of CEQA Review and
Policies of Environmental Impact Reports
A CEQA analysis begins with a public agency’s initial
determination as to whether a proposed activity is subject to
environmental review or is exempt.32 Once the agency deems an
activity to be subject to CEQA, the initial procedural steps of the
CEQA review process include the preparation of an initial study
regarding the proposed activity and potential resulting impacts to the
environment,33 and a decision to prepare either a negative
declaration, mitigated negative declaration, or EIR.34 If an EIR is to

30. Id. § 21083.1 (emphasis added).
31. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–5.
32. An activity may be exempt from CEQA because it does not constitute a project, or
because it fits within one of CEQA’s designated exemptions. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 69–
70; Selmi, supra note 3, at 960.
33. An initial study may take the form of a questionnaire, checklist, or narrative report
regarding the characteristics of the proposed project or activity. tit. 14, §§ 15060, 15063, 15102,
15365.
34. If the lead agency determines that no significant environmental impacts will result from
the proposed activity, a negative declaration may be adopted. A variation of the negative
declaration is known as a “mitigated negative declaration,” which finds that no significant
environmental impacts will result after certain specified mitigation measures are imposed on the
project. If significant environmental impacts may exist that cannot be mitigated, an EIR must be
prepared. See PUB. RES. §§ 21064, 21064.5, 21080(c); tit. 14, §§ 15002(k)(2), 15070–15075,
15369.5, 15371. See also REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 249–50, 312–13 (describing negative
declarations, mitigated negative declarations, and applicable thresholds for determining the
significance of environmental impacts).
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be prepared, the lead agency35 issues a notice of preparation of an
EIR,36 prepares a draft EIR,37 and circulates the draft EIR for public
review and comment.38 After the close of the public comment period,
the lead agency prepares written responses to the comments on the
draft EIR and prepares a final EIR incorporating these written
comments and responses.39 In conjunction with the agency’s
approval of the proposed project, the agency must certify the final
EIR,40 which includes the adoption of findings regarding CEQA
compliance,41 the adoption of a mitigation reporting or monitoring
program,42 and the potential adoption of a statement of overriding
considerations.43 After a final EIR is certified, a party objecting to the
lead agency’s CEQA determination may file a petition for a writ of
mandate seeking injunctive relief from the courts.44
The purpose of the EIR is to identify the significant
environmental impacts of a project, identify alternatives to the
project, and, if possible, indicate ways that the significant impacts
can be avoided.45 As the “heart of CEQA,” the EIR informs the
public of the possible environmental impacts of the proposed

35. The lead agency is either the agency carrying out the proposed project or, in the case of a
private project, the agency with the greatest responsibility for supervising or approving the
project as a whole. tit. 14, §§ 15051(a), 15051(b)(1).
36. PUB. RES. § 21080.4(a); tit. 14, §§ 15082, 15375.
37. PUB. RES. § 21100; tit. 14, §§ 15084, 15086, 15120–15131.
38. PUB. RES. § 21091; tit. 14, §§ 15072–15073, 15087, 15105, 15200–15209.
39. PUB. RES. §§ 21091(d)(2), 21104, 21153; tit. 14, §§ 15072–15073, 15087, 15105,
15200–15209.
40. To certify a final EIR, a lead agency must conclude that the EIR has been completed in
compliance with CEQA, that the agency has reviewed and considered the information in the EIR
prior to approving the project, and that the final EIR reflects the lead agency’s independent
judgment and analysis. PUB. RES. § 21082.1(c)(3); tit. 14, § 15090(a).
41. PUB. RES. § 21081(a); tit. 14, §§ 15091(a), 15096(h).
42. PUB. RES. §§ 21081.6(a)(1), 21081.7; tit. 14, §§ 15091(d), 15097.
43. Mitigation monitoring programs are the mechanisms by which agencies ensure
compliance with the mitigation measures included in the certified EIR. See PUB. RES.
§ 21081.6(a); tit. 14, §§ 15091(d), 15097(a); REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 391–92. A statement
of overriding considerations may be adopted by a public agency when it finds that a significant
environmental impact cannot be mitigated to a level of insignificance, but that the effects of those
impacts are outweighed by other identified benefits. PUB. RES. § 21081(b); tit. 14, § 15093.
44. A detailed discussion of the mechanism of legal challenges to CEQA approvals is
outside the scope of this Note. For an overview of this process and related issues, see
REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 887–921.
45. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 35–36; see also PUB. RES. § 21061 (defining
environmental impact report).
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project.46 Accordingly, it fosters “informed self-government” while
protecting the environment.47 Importantly, environmental review is
intended to inform the public and public officials “of the
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are
made.”48 Therefore, EIRs are to “be prepared as early as feasible in
the planning process to enable environmental considerations to
influence project program and design and yet late enough to provide
meaningful information for environmental assessment.”49
Generally, deciding when to prepare an EIR is left to the
agency’s reasonable judgment.50 Agencies should avoid preparing an
EIR too early, for a proposed project may not be sufficiently well
defined for its environmental impacts to be fully known.51 However,
agencies should also avoid waiting too long to prepare an EIR, for
the public and the lead agency are supposed to understand a project’s
potential environmental impacts so that they can make informed
decisions regarding the project before it is approved.52 At the heart of
this timing decision is the question of when a project arises for
purposes of CEQA.
D. CEQA’s Applicability to Projects
CEQA applies to “discretionary53 projects proposed to be carried
out or approved by public agencies . . . .”54 This statutory language
requires a two-part analysis to determine whether CEQA applies to
46. tit. 14, § 15003(a) (citing Cnty. of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Ct. App. 1973)).
47. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278,
283 (Cal. 1988).
48. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990).
49. tit. 14, § 15004(b) (emphasis added).
50. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. “The question of timing of the preparation of an EIR
[is] basically an administrative decision to be made by a public agency consistent with the overall
objectives of CEQA.” Mount Sutro Def. Comm. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 Cal. Rptr.
365, 374 (Ct. App. 1978).
51. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. “[W]here future development is unspecified and
uncertain, no purpose can be served by requiring an EIR to engage in sheer speculation as to
future environmental consequences.” Lake Cnty. Energy Council v. Cnty. of Lake, 139 Cal. Rptr.
176, 178 (Ct. App. 1977).
52. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 282–83 (Cal. 1988).
53. A discretionary action requires “deliberation, decision and judgment,” while a
ministerial action is equivalent to the “performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice
of his own.” Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 356–57 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Morgan v. Cnty. of
Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Ct. App. 1964)); see also tit. 14, §§ 15357, 15369 (defining
discretionary and ministerial actions, respectively).
54. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(a) (West 2007).
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an agency action—first, whether the agency has decided to approve
an action, and second, whether the action constitutes a project.55
While CEQA’s statutory language does not define approval, the
CEQA Guidelines define the term as “the decision by a public
agency which commits the agency to a definite course of action in
regard to a project intended to be carried out by any person.”56 For
private projects, “approval occurs upon the earliest commitment to
issue or the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary
contract . . . or other form of financial assistance . . . or other
entitlement for use of the project.”57 As the courts have interpreted
this language, an approval occurs when an agency has in fact
foreclosed any meaningful options to going forward with the
project.58
CEQA’s statutory language defines a project as “an activity
which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment,
or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the
environment . . . .”59 The CEQA Guidelines add some significant
detail in defining a project as “the whole of an action, which has a
potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the
environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in
the environment . . . .”60 However, this is far from a clear standard
and regularly causes concerns for agencies and project proponents.61
The environmental review process can be very lengthy and very
expensive. As a practical matter, some project proponents will
require some form of preliminary indication from a city or other
agency that their project may at least be potentially feasible before
the proponents decide to move forward with a formal project

55. Lexington Hills Ass’n v. State, 246 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104–06 (Ct. App. 1988); REMY ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 70. Note also that actions deemed to be exempt are not subject to CEQA. An
action may be exempt because it does not constitute approval of a project, or because it is
categorically or statutorily exempt from CEQA. For more discussion of categorical exemptions,
which are beyond the scope of this Note, see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 69–70, and Deborah
Behles, Why CEQA Exemption Decisions Need Additional Notice Requirements, 33 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2009).
56. tit. 14, § 15352(a) (emphasis added).
57. Id. § 15352(b) (emphasis added).
58. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 71 (citing tit. 14, §§ 15004(b), 15352).
59. PUB. RES. § 21065.
60. tit. 14, § 15378(a) (emphasis added).
61. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 77–82.
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proposal and request for agency approval.62 However, an agency’s
indication of support for a project may rise to the level of a project
approval if it commits the agency to a sufficiently definite course of
action.63 As a result of such preliminary agency support, CEQA
review may be required for a project that is not yet fully realized,
which may be contrary to the purposes of CEQA.64 The precise
moment when a project comes into existence for CEQA purposes
and what might constitute an agency’s approval of such a project has
been consistently disputed and litigated since CEQA’s adoption.65
E. Previous Court Interpretations
of Project Approvals
California CEQA court decisions have marked the beginning of
the “whole of the action” as the point at which the first “essential
step culminating in an action that may affect the environment”
occurs.66 In Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission of
Ventura County,67 the California Supreme Court held that a proposed
annexation of property by a city required an EIR, even though a
development project proposed for the property would receive its own
CEQA review at some unspecified time in the future.68 In reaching
this decision, the court held that the purpose of CEQA is:
[N]ot to generate paper, but to compel government at all
levels to make decisions with environmental consequences
in mind. CEQA does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that
these decisions will always be those which favor
environmental considerations. At the very least, however,
the People have a right to expect that those who must
62. Application of the League of California Cities to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of
Defendant/Respondent City of West Hollywood; and Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae at 7–8,
Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008) (No. S151402) [hereinafter Brief
for League of California Cities].
63. tit. 14, § 15352(a).
64. “[W]here future development is unspecified and uncertain, no purpose can be served by
requiring an EIR to engage in sheer speculation as to future environmental consequences.” Lake
Cnty. Energy Council v. Cnty. of Lake, 139 Cal. Rptr. 176, 178 (Ct. App. 1977).
65. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 16–18.
66. Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168, 180 (Cal.
1982) (citing Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975)); see also
tit. 14, § 15378(a) (defining project).
67. 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
68. Id. at 1029–30.
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decide will approach their task neutrally, with no parochial
interest at stake.69
The court reaffirmed Bozung in Fullerton Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Education.70 The court found that the State
Board of Education must analyze the environmental effects of
creating a new unified school district before dividing an existing
district and must complete this analysis before authorizing an
election by voters in the proposed new district.71
Following the court’s decisions in Bozung and Fullerton, several
California Court of Appeal decisions took up the issue of when a
project approval had occurred, with varying results. In Stand Tall on
Principles v. Shasta Union High School District,72 a school board
passed resolutions recommending a specific development site and
authorizing the purchase of that property for a new high school,
“contingent upon completion of the EIR process and final state
approval.”73 The court of appeal held that the school board had not
“approved” the project because the resolutions did not “commit the
District to a definite course of action.”74 Conversely, in Citizens for
Responsible Government v. City of Albany,75 the court of appeal
stopped a city from entering into a development agreement for a
horse-racing track without first completing CEQA review.76 The
agreement contained provisions for a CEQA review process, but
called for the review to be performed after voters approved the
agreement and several related gambling measures.77 In reaching its
decision, the court found that the development agreement gave the
developer of the racetrack a vested right to proceed with the project
“within certain clear and narrowly defined parameters.”78
Additionally, notwithstanding the election provisions, the city had

69. Id. at 1030.
70. 654 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
71. Id. at 171.
72. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 1991).
73. Id. at 108.
74. Id. at 111. Note that the court suggested that an EIR would be required before the school
district actually acquired the property. Id.
75. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id. at 116.
77. Id. at 105–06.
78. Id. at 111.
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“committed . . . to a definite course of action”79 and had “contracted
away its power to consider the full range of alternatives.”80
One year after Citizens for Responsible Government, another
court of appeal decision swung back in the other direction in City of
Vernon v. Board of Harbor Commissioners.81 Prior to adopting a
final EIR, the board adopted a reuse plan for certain Navy properties
and entered into a statement of intent with a shipping company
regarding the parties’ intent to enter into a lease for the properties.82
The trial court found that the board had not complied with CEQA
because project approval was a “foregone conclusion . . . throughout
the CEQA process.”83 However, the court of appeal reversed, finding
that the reuse plan could be amended if necessary to mitigate
environmental impacts identified in the project’s EIR and that the
statement of intent to enter into a lease did not create a vested right.84
In 2007, the court of appeal heard four CEQA cases regarding
whether an agency action constituted approval of a project. Each of
these four cases also involved agreements between cities and project
proponents conditioned on future compliance with CEQA. Of these
four cases, Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community
Services District85 (McCloud) and Save Tara v. City of West
Hollywood86 would prove to be the most significant.87
In McCloud, a citizens’ group filed a petition for a writ of
mandate regarding an agreement between the McCloud Community
79. Id. at 114.
80. Id. at 115.
81. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (Ct. App. 1998).
82. Id. at 500.
83. Id. at 501.
84. Id. at 503–04.
85. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2007).
86. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2007).
87. The two other appellate court cases from 2007 were Friends of the Sierra Railroad v.
Tuolumne Park and Recreation District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (Ct. App. 2007), and County of
Amador v. City of Plymouth, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704 (Ct. App. 2007). In Friends of the Sierra
Railroad, the court found that sale of land, to allegedly facilitate a proposed casino development
that was conditioned on future compliance with CEQA, was not itself a project subject to CEQA,
because no particular development plans had been announced and because any discussion of
proposed development in conjunction with the sale of the property was too speculative to trigger
CEQA analysis. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501, 504–05. In County of Amador, the court found that a
municipal services agreement between the city and Indian tribe, which would have required the
city to vacate a portion of a public road to provide access to a proposed casino, committed the city
to a definite course of action, and thereby constituted an approval of a project requiring CEQA
analysis. 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07.
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Services District, which supplied the town of McCloud with its
drinking water supply, and Nestle Waters North America. The
agreement, which would have run for an initial fifty-year period with
a guaranteed right of renewal for another fifty years, provided that
the district would sell 1,600 acre-feet of spring water each year to
Nestle for bottling and sale.88 The agreement required Nestle to
comply with a number of conditions, including locating a suitable
site for a required bottling plant, designing a new separate water
collection and delivery system so as not to interrupt the district’s
other water delivery obligations, and obtaining all required
discretionary permits and performing environmental review under
CEQA.89
The McCloud trial court found that the agreement constituted an
“initial and integral stage of a project within the meaning of
CEQA,”90 because the approval of the agreement amounted to “the
creation of an entitlement for Nestle and committed the District to a
definite course of action.”91 On review, the court of appeal agreed
that Nestle’s “ultimate” purchase of spring water—which would
involve constructing a new local bottling facility, trucking or piping
the water to this proposed facility, potentially digging new
groundwater wells, and other related activities—would “amount to a
project requiring CEQA compliance.”92 However, the court found
that the execution of the agreement did not constitute an “approval”
of a project, nor did it commit the district to a particular course of
action, due to the multiple contingencies in the agreement, the fact
that neither party was bound to the agreement until CEQA review
and compliance were completed, and the fact that the district was not
prevented from considering (and imposing as conditions of approval)
all feasible mitigation measures.93
In Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood,94 the court of appeal
rejected a city’s approval of an agreement conditioned on future
CEQA review. The facts of Save Tara recalled many of the same
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

McCloud, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 3–6.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2007).
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concepts that were at issue in McCloud, but the appellate decisions
were in clear conflict with each other.95 Recognizing this analytical
divide, the California Supreme Court granted review to Save Tara.
III. THE SAVE TARA DECISION AND
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF CEQA
A. Save Tara Case
Background and Holding
In 1997, the City of West Hollywood (the “City”) received a
donation of a large colonial-revival-style house located at 1343
North Laurel Avenue.96 The house was originally constructed in 1923
and was designated as a local cultural resource in 1994.97 At the time
of its donation to the City, the house had been converted into four
apartment units.98 In 2003, two nonprofit community housing
developers proposed the development of approximately thirty-five
low-income housing units for senior citizens on the property and
approached the City for assistance with the developers’ grant
application to the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).99 On June 9, 2003, the city council approved
the granting of a purchase option to the developers in order for the
developers to demonstrate to HUD that they were in control of the
project site.100 In a June 10, 2003, letter in support of the HUD grant
application, the city manager stated that the City had approved the
sale of the property to the developers at a negligible cost and would
commit an additional $1 million toward development costs.101

95. Todd W. Smith, Save Tara and Concerned McCloud Citizens: When Do Conditional
Agreements Require CEQA Review?, ABA ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE NEWSL.,
May 2008, at 11, 12.
96. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 349 (Cal. 2008). The house had been
nicknamed “Tara” by longtime owner and resident Elsie Weisman (whose favorite movie was
Gone with the Wind) for its look of a grand Southern manor. Allegra Allison, Op-Ed., Accidental
Activist, WEHONEWS.COM (Apr. 22, 2010), http://wehonews.com/z/wehonews/archive/page.php?
articleID=4703.
97. Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 349.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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In late 2003, HUD approved a $4.2 million grant to the
developers.102 The City sent e-mail and newsletter announcements to
residents regarding the grant, explaining that it “will be used to build
35 affordable senior residential units, rehabilitate a historic house,
and provide a public pocket park on Laurel Avenue.”103 Shortly after
the City announced the grant award, a City housing manager told a
tenant of the property that she would be relocated in connection with
the new project.104
In April 2004, the City announced an upcoming public hearing
to consider the approval of an agreement to facilitate the
development of the project, which would be “subject to
environmental review” and other required approvals.105 A group of
City residents, calling themselves “Save Tara,” wrote to the City to
urge that CEQA review be performed before the City approved any
new agreement or made any further commitment to the proposed
project.106 At its May 2004 meeting, the City proceeded to approve
the proposed agreement. This agreement expressly withheld the
City’s commitment to a definite course of action regarding the
project, and explicitly conditioned the property’s final conveyance
on the satisfaction of “all applicable requirements of CEQA.”107
Notably, however, the agreement allowed the city manager to waive
these conditions.108 In July 2004, Save Tara filed a petition for a writ
of mandate; the group alleged that the City had violated CEQA by
failing to prepare an EIR prior to its May approval of the conditional
agreement.109
The trial court denied Save Tara’s petition, but the court of
appeal later reversed, finding that the proposed project was wellenough defined so as to allow meaningful analysis under CEQA and
102. Id.
103. Id. The e-mail described the project as a “win-win-win” for the city. Id.
104. Id. at 350.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 355. This agreement was identified as a “Conditional Agreement for Conveyance
and Development of Property.” Id. at 350. It contained details of the exterior and interior design
of the project, the phases of development, the City’s conveyance of the property, and a City loan
to the developer. Id.
108. Id. at 351.
109. In August 2004, the City executed a revised agreement that removed the city manager’s
discretion to waive the contingent CEQA analysis. Id. This did not cause the Save Tara
organization to withdraw their lawsuit. Id.
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that this analysis should have occurred between the awarding of the
HUD grant in 2003 and the City’s 2004 approval of the conditional
agreement.110 Attempting to define a bright-line rule, the court of
appeal held that any agreement, whether conditional or
unconditional, would constitute an approval requiring CEQA
analysis if the project were sufficiently well defined at the time of the
agreement.111 In 2007, the California Supreme Court granted the
City’s petition for review to take up the substantive question of
whether an EIR was required before the City’s approval of the
conditional agreement.112
1. Supreme Court’s Review of EIR Timing Requirements
The court first looked at the CEQA Guidelines’ statement that
an “approval” of a private project “occurs upon the earliest
commitment to issue or the issuance by the public agency of a
discretionary contract, grant, subsidy, loan or other form of financial
assistance . . . .”113 The court also noted that the Guidelines require
agencies to balance the timing of CEQA analysis—an agency should
not require an EIR until the project is sufficiently defined to permit a
meaningful environmental assessment, but should not delay
preparing an EIR for so long that it fails to serve its intended
function as a tool to aid an agency in making a fully informed
decision on a project.114
On review, the court determined that Save Tara’s challenge to
the City both postponing its EIR preparation and making CEQA
analysis of the project contingent on future conditions involved
predominantly procedural issues.115 In addition, the court framed this
timing question by asking whether the City’s approval of the

110. Id. at 352.
111. Id. at 358.
112. Id. at 352. Note that while this lawsuit was making its way through the courts, the City
did in fact certify an EIR for the project in 2006, causing one court of appeal justice to write a
dissenting opinion, arguing that Save Tara’s suit was moot. The supreme court agreed to hear the
City’s mootness argument but quickly dismissed it, noting that no irreversible changes had
occurred to the property during the pendency of the lawsuit, and that Save Tara could still receive
the relief it was seeking (i.e., for the City to rescind its approvals of the project). Id. at 352–53.
113. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15352(b) (2011).
114. Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 353–54 (citing tit. 14, § 15004(b)).
115. Id. at 355.
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conditional agreement was in fact a project for CEQA purposes.116
As a result, the court could independently review the City’s action on
a de novo basis with heightened scrutiny.117 As the court explained,
this review ensures that agencies cannot evade the central purposes
of CEQA by establishing procedures that allow for the approval of a
project to occur prior to the EIR preparation.118 Therefore, the court
needed to closely examine the specifics of the City’s conditional
agreement.
2. Was the City’s Conditional CEQA Compliance Allowed?
The California Supreme Court did not follow the court of
appeal’s holding that any agreement, conditional or unconditional,
would necessarily trigger CEQA analysis.119 Nor did it agree with the
City that the conditional agreement in question satisfied CEQA, or
that an agency commitment constituting a CEQA approval should be
limited to unconditional agreements that irrevocably vest
development rights and bind the agency to a definite course of
action.120 Instead, the court adopted an intermediate test. It held that
while a CEQA compliance condition can be a legitimate ingredient
in a “preliminary public-private agreement for exploration of a
proposed project” if the agreement, “viewed in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, commits the public agency as a practical
matter to the project,” the insertion of a CEQA compliance condition
will not prevent the agreement from being considered an approval
requiring CEQA review.121
The court justified its holding by noting that if CEQA analysis
were only limited to unconditional agency commitments that vested
specific development rights for a project, by the time such actions
occur, the project may have already acquired so much “bureaucratic
116. Id. (citing Muzzy Ranch v. Solano Cnty. Airport Land Use Comm’n, 160 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2007)).
117. Id. (citing Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990),
and Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 150 P.3d
709 (Cal. 2007)).
118. Id. (“While an agency may certainly adjust its rules so as to set ‘[t]he exact date of
approval,’ . . . an agency has no discretion to define approval so as to make its commitment to a
project precede the required preparation of an EIR.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
119. Id. at 358–59.
120. Id. at 360.
121. Id. at 356.
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and financial momentum” that a strong incentive would exist to
ignore environmental concerns.122 Additionally, postponing the EIR
process until a binding development agreement exists would
undermine CEQA’s goal of demonstrating to the public that the
environmental implications of a project have in fact been analyzed.123
Instead, such postponement creates a risk that the EIR will be viewed
as a post hoc rationalization of the agency’s action.124
3. Did the City Approve or Commit to the Project?
To apply its new intermediate test, the court stated that the terms
of the agreement itself, as well as the surrounding circumstances,
should be analyzed to determine whether the City committed itself to
the project.125 Applying this approach to the facts of the case, the
court found that the City’s May and August agreements showed
commitment to the project.126 The City repeatedly stated that the
project would be developed as outlined in the HUD application, and
allowed a nearly $500,000 loan to the developers that was not
conditioned on CEQA compliance and would not be repaid if the
City did not give final approval to the project.127 Furthermore, the
May agreement limited the City’s discretion over the CEQA process
by granting the city manager the authority to waive CEQA
requirements.128 Although this provision was revised in the August
agreement so that the city manager no longer had the authority to
determine or waive CEQA compliance, the court held that the city
council’s prior approval of the May agreement “had shown a
willingness to give up further authority over CEQA compliance in
favor of dependence on the city manager’s determination.”129 Finally,
the agreements included language that the “‘requirements of CEQA’
be ‘satisfied,’” raising questions as to whether the City would be able

122. Id. at 358 (citing Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764
P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 359–60 (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Albany, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d
102 (Ct. App. 1997)).
125. Id. at 360.
126. Id. at 361.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 362.
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to reject the project on substantive grounds even if it found the EIR
legally adequate.130
Furthermore, the court found evidence of the City’s approval of
the project in the overall circumstances surrounding the conditional
agreement. Specifically, the court pointed to the City’s public emails and newsletters unequivocally advancing support for the
project, preliminary tenant relocation actions, and willingness to
condition its obligation to convey the property based on whether
CEQA was satisfied as “reasonably determined” by the city
manager.131 Ultimately, the provisions in the City’s agreements and
the surrounding factual circumstances convinced the court that the
City had improperly “committed itself to a definite course of action
regarding the project before fully evaluating its environmental
effects.”132
4. Distinction from Precedent Decisions
The Save Tara court briefly discussed the Stand Tall and
McCloud decisions, and “without questioning the[ir] correctness” on
their facts, noted that each of those cases involved particular
circumstances that limited their reaches.133 According to the court,
the agreement at the center of McCloud did not contain sufficiently
definite detail regarding the proposed water bottling plant, and this
lack of detail would cause any environmental analysis to be
premature and speculative.134 Thus, the court’s reading of McCloud
requires a court to look at issues of “definiteness” when it is
examining an agency’s commitment to a project.
In distinguishing Stand Tall, the Save Tara court noted that this
case involved a property purchase agreement that may, “as a
practical matter in a competitive real estate market,” sometimes need
to be initiated before completing CEQA analysis.135 In fact, Section
15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA Guidelines makes a specific exception
for these types of purchase agreements.136 While agencies may not
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356–57.
Id. at 357.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(A) (2011).
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“make a decision to proceed with the use of a site for facilities which
would require CEQA review” before conducting such review,
agencies are explicitly authorized to “designate a preferred site for
CEQA review and may enter into land acquisition agreements when
the agency has conditioned the agency’s future use of the site on
CEQA compliance.”137 The Save Tara court generously stated that
the CEQA Guidelines’ exception for land purchases is a “reasonable
interpretation of CEQA,” but warned that this exception, which
Stand Tall relied on, should not “swallow the general rule (reflected
in the same regulation) that a development decision having
potentially significant environmental effects must be preceded, not
followed, by CEQA review.”138 The Save Tara decision thus cabins
both the previously clearly understood meaning of Section
15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA Guidelines and the precedent holdings
in McCloud and Stand Tall, and imposes its new fact-specific inquiry
on future conditional agreements.
5. Is the Save Tara Test Workable?
The Save Tara court explicitly refrained from establishing a
bright-line rule that would require any agreement pertaining to the
development of a well-defined project to be subject to CEQA, and
the court declined to limit its holding to unconditional agreements
that irrevocably vest development rights.139 As a result, the Save Tara
test that the court required is a fact-specific inquiry where an
agreement’s conditioning of final approval on CEQA compliance is
relevant but not determinative of whether the agreement constitutes a
project for CEQA purposes.140 The court did acknowledge that cities,
particularly with respect to projects on public land, often reach
arrangements with potential developers—including purchase option
agreements, memoranda of understanding, and exclusive negotiating
agreements—before they decide on the specifics of a project.141
However, because the court declined to set forth a clear threshold for
analyzing these particular forms of agreement to determine whether
such agreements would constitute approval of a project, it remains
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 357 (quoting tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(A)).
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 359.
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unclear when, for example, a redevelopment agency must undertake
environmental review in connection with an exclusive negotiation
agreement or when a transportation agency leasing land for
development must undertake environmental review if the agency has
publicly stated its support for a future project or provided any other
sort of tangible support.
B. Subsequent Application
of the Save Tara Test
California courts of appeal have subsequently applied the
flexible Save Tara test in several cases, and each decision proves that
determining whether a development-related agreement constitutes a
project approval under CEQA is highly dependent on the particular
facts of the agreement.
In RiverWatch v. Olivenhain Municipal Water District,142 a
water district entered into an agreement with a county agency to
truck water to a landfill site without considering an EIR that the
agency prepared for the landfill project.143 Following Save Tara, the
court of appeal examined the specific terms of the agreement and the
circumstances surrounding the agreement.144 It found that the
agreement itself constituted an approval of the landfill project
because it set forth specific details about the district’s obligation to
deliver water and construct roadway improvements to allow the
deliveries.145
The court’s finding of a CEQA violation in the RiverWatch case
contrasts with the courts of appeal’s other applications of the Save
Tara test to date. In Parchester Village Neighborhood Council v.
City of Richmond,146 a city entered into a municipal services
agreement with a tribe, which required the tribe to pay the city for
certain fire, police, and public works services, in return for the city’s
support of the tribe’s casino application to federal authorities.147
142. 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2009).
143. As a responsible agency, the water district had a responsibility to consider those aspects
of the project that were subject to its jurisdiction. Id. at 638–39 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15381 (2011)).
144. Id. at 644.
145. Id. The court also examined the district’s actions while reviewing and approving the
agreement, and found that these actions constituted a “commitment” to the project. Id.
146. 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (Ct. App. 2010).
147. Id. at 739–40.
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While the agreement did not require the city to commit to any
changes in the environment, it provided that if the city did make any
such changes, the city would perform CEQA analysis.148 In addition
to finding that the casino was not a project of the city’s within the
meaning of CEQA,149 the court held that this agreement simply
constituted a city-funding mechanism and did not represent a
commitment to any particular project at any particular time.150
The court of appeals upheld another preliminary agreement in
City of Santee v. County of San Diego.151 There, the city and county
executed an agreement that identified two potential sites for a prison
reentry facility, acknowledged that the county would have
preferential access to state funding if one of the sites was selected,
and committed the county to convey land if one of the sites was
selected.152 The agreement also contained a contingent CEQA
analysis provision.153 The court held that this agreement did not
commit the county to a definite course of action because it did not
select any single location for the reentry facility, did not reference
any particular jail facility for which the funding would be used, and
did not obligate the county to select any of the sites.154
To date, a court of appeal’s most detailed application of the Save
Tara test has been Cedar Fair L.P. v. City of Santa Clara.155 In
conjunction with the planned development of a new football stadium
for the San Francisco 49ers, the city and its redevelopment agency
adopted by public vote a thirty-nine-page “stadium term sheet” that
described a well-defined proposed project.156 The term sheet
specified various city obligations pertaining to the proposed stadium,
including the responsibility of creating the stadium authority to build,
own, and operate the stadium, and to form a community facilities
148. Id. at 740.
149. Id. at 742 (“In our view, the Tribe’s casino development does not constitute a ‘project’ of
the City under CEQA because the City has no legal authority over the property upon which the
casino will be situated.”).
150. Id. at 745.
151. 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47 (Ct. App. 2010).
152. Id. at 49.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 54–55.
155. 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667 (Ct. App. 2011).
156. Id. at 679–81. The term sheet described the proposed stadium’s location, seating
capacity, ownership structure, lease terms, and anticipated economic benefits to accrue to the city.
Id. at 679.
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district for special taxation purposes.157 City officials publicly
discussed the possibility of a new stadium in the city, and the city
was allegedly a vocal and vigorous advocate of the proposed
project.158
However, the term sheet also explicitly stated that its purpose
was to memorialize preliminary terms that had been negotiated to
date.159 Furthermore, the term sheet provided that the stadium shall
not proceed unless full agreements were executed “based upon
information produced from the CEQA environmental review
process . . . .”160 The term sheet itself and the agenda reports from the
city’s approval of the term sheet indicate that the city retained the
flexibility to approve a different project, or no project at all.161
Finally, the term sheet explicitly stated that it was not intended “to
create any binding contractual obligations” nor “commit any Party to
a particular course of action.”162
In reviewing the term sheet and the city’s actions, the court of
appeal applied the Save Tara test and closely compared the facts of
that case to the Cedar Fair facts. The court acknowledged that
“[d]etermining on which side of the Save Tara line the term sheet
falls is not an easy judgment call,”163 and it recited the extensive
project details that were contained in the term sheet.164 The court
ultimately held, however, that the term sheet merely memorialized
various preliminary negotiating terms and only mandated that the
parties use the term sheet as the framework for future negotiations.165
Therefore, approval of the term sheet did not trigger CEQA review.
These opinions show that the fact-specific, open-ended Save
Tara test provides flexibility for project proponents and detractors to
make arguments regarding CEQA compliance. It also demonstrates a
lack of certainty regarding whether agency actions may be subject to
CEQA. Although the Save Tara decision noted that certain
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 680.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 679–81.
Id. at 681.
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preliminary agreements with potential developers may not trigger the
expensive EIR process and that certain agreements have been upheld
in Parchester, Santee, and Cedar Fair, the lack of a bright-line test
means that alleged violations of CEQA under a Save Tara test will
likely continue to be litigated on a case-by-case basis.
IV. SAVE TARA’S UNCERTAINTY
HAS HIGH COSTS
Nonprofit affordable-housing providers frequently use
conditional agreements, such as the agreement at issue in Save Tara,
to demonstrate that they have sufficient “site control” over proposed
affordable-housing sites to secure the funds that are needed to go
through the lengthy and costly process of seeking land use
entitlements and participating in the review process that CEQA
requires.166 Rather than constituting approval of a project, “these
agreements merely give nonprofit, affordable-housing providers the
ability to chase financing for the proposed project and, once
obtained, to maintain it during the often very lengthy land use
entitlement and CEQA assessment process.”167 While previous court
decisions interpreting Section 15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA
Guidelines, including the Stand Tall decision, may have once been
relied on to exempt such land acquisition agreements, now a court
must perform a fact-specific inquiry into potential “commitment”
under Save Tara. As a result, affordable-housing providers may find
that cities are less willing to enter into such agreements, thereby
hindering housing developers from successfully obtaining funding.
Moreover, following Cedar Fair, these agreements may need to be
limited to preliminary negotiating points and contain a basic level of
flexibility regarding the scope of the proposed project. In order to
restructure precedent agreements so as to avoid any semblance of
city or agency “precommitment” to a project, affordable-housing
developers will be required to expend more of their limited time and
resources on such predevelopment activities, which may delay or

166. Application of Housing California and the Southern California Association of Nonprofit
Housing to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant City of West Hollywood; Proposed
Brief of Amici Curiae at 2, Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008) (No.
S151402) [hereinafter Brief for Housing California].
167. Id. at 11.
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otherwise obstruct the ultimate success of their proposed housing
projects.
Additionally, beyond the scope of a specific agreement with a
city or other agency, these providers must also demonstrate the
feasibility of a proposed project to public agencies and potential
funders, which requires the preparation of design concepts, financial
proformas, and community outreach efforts.168 If these materials are
shared and made publicly available as part of an agency’s decision to
enter into a conditional agreement, they could become part of the
“circumstances” that a court takes into account when it determines
whether a project approval has occurred under Save Tara.
As a result, because the Save Tara test may require that such
conditional agreements constitute some evidence of a project
“approval,” affordable-housing providers may be required to “devote
their scarce resources to participating in CEQA review before they
even know whether they can secure all of the funding required to
pursue the affordable-housing projects or whether they will be
permitted to construct on publicly-owned land.”169 This
reprioritization will burden affordable-housing providers with
substantial new barriers, making it even more difficult to provide
needed housing for low-income populations.
Beyond affordable-housing projects, many cities offer processes
to provide developers with predevelopment application consultations
to assist the developers with their development-proposal submittals.
Local governments often established these processes to meet the
California Permit Streamlining Act.170 Predevelopment submissions
“typically contain conceptual site plans, square footage information
for buildings, renderings, floor layouts, parking layouts, on-site
traffic circulation, parking, space requirements, setbacks, building
heights and other detailed information.”171 City staff, after looking at
a developer’s submission, “can then provide preliminary review and

168. Id. at 8–9.
169. Id. at 3.
170. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 65920–65964 (West 2009). The Permit Streamlining Act attempts
to provide relief for project applicants by prohibiting protracted and unjustified delays in the
processing of permit applications. Id. (explaining the purpose of the Permit Streamlining Act in
the statute’s “Notes of Decisions”). For a discussion of the Permit Streamlining Act’s relation to
CEQA, see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 707–26.
171. Brief for League of California Cities, supra note 62, at 7–8.
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feedback.”172 Some cities may even suggest public workshops and
community presentations so the developer can gather input and
potentially redesign the project to be more acceptable to the
community. It may only be after all of these steps that the developer
precisely determines what the proposed project may be, and that it
formally submits an application for that specific project to the city
for review, at which point the CEQA analysis will be performed.173 If
a city were to require CEQA review at the moment that a
preliminary, speculative project is first presented to city staff, many
potentially beneficial projects would fail to advance beyond this
initial stage as a result of the delayed timeline and increased costs of
CEQA compliance.
In addition to increased costs and development obstacles for
project proponents, the Save Tara decision will result in additional
costs to cities and public agencies. In order to comply with Save
Tara, agencies have already revisited their internal policies and
procedures regarding exclusive negotiating agreements and
memoranda of understanding, and they have required these
agreements to be less specific regarding proposed projects and more
explicit regarding withholding approval until CEQA analysis is
completed.174 However, even after such revisions to internal policies
are made, the threat of a Save Tara violation may compel an agency
to prematurely undertake CEQA review “before a potential project’s
impacts can be reasonably foreseen.”175 Furthermore, the Save Tara
holding gives project opponents a simple tool that they can use to
threaten a public agency with a lawsuit, resulting in slower, more
deliberate agency action.176
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Memorandum on Exclusive Negotiating Agreement and Predevelopment Loan
with Affordable Housing Associates to the City of Sonoma City Council (May 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Memorandum to the City of Sonoma City Council], available at
http://www.sonomacity.org/Uploads/19121.pdf (city council staff report stating that a proposed
exclusive negotiating agreement is explicitly contingent on future CEQA compliance and does
not constitute approval of any defined project).
175. Brief for League of California Cities, supra note 62, at 2.
176. See, e.g., Memorandum of Affordable Housing Loan Program Guidelines from Jennifer
Estrella, Senior Fin. Analyst, City of Elk Grove, to City of Elk Grove City Council (Oct. 13,
2010), available at http://www.elkgrovecity.org/documents/agendas/attachments/attachments/
2010/10-13-10_10.3.pdf (city staff recommending that the city council proceed cautiously with
all future affordable housing predevelopment and loan application matters in light of the Save
Tara decision).
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It is not surprising that Save Tara has become a watchword for
both project opponents and antidevelopment advocates and that
many CEQA lawsuits that these parties threaten point to the
arguments that the court set forth in Save Tara.177 As a result, cities
and public agencies have responded by changing internal policies
regarding entering into conditional agreements.178 Generally, in an
effort to avoid the appearance of premature commitment to a project,
cities and agencies have ensured that many preliminary conditional
agreements now contain less specific information regarding potential
projects, including less discussion of why the project may be
beneficial to the city or agency.179 In addition, agencies may become
more reticent to make any public statements about projects that could
be interpreted as supporting the project prior to any official
approval.180 One potential and undesirable cumulative effect of these
changes is that less information may be publicly available regarding
potential projects, in direct conflict with CEQA’s purpose of
informing the public of potential environmental issues.
The Cedar Fair decision indicates that a city or other public
agency may approve a detailed preliminary agreement regarding a
project without violating Save Tara, so long as the approval remains
an “agreement to agree” that is nonbinding, that is conditioned on
future CEQA review, and that preserves a city’s flexibility regarding
the project.181 However, under the Save Tara test, the facts of each
177. See, e.g., Letter from Amy L. White, Interim Exec. Dir., LandWatch Monterey Cnty., to
Lou Calcagno, Chair, Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Apr. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.landwatch.org/pages/issuesactions/coastal/042809bosletter.html (opposing any waterrights memorandum of agreement on the basis of an alleged Save Tara violation); see also Letter
from We Are Marina Del Rey to L.A. Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.wearemdr.com/projects/public-comments-letter-on-senior-uxury-retirementhotel~print.shtml (opposing the conceptual approval of a proposed mixed-use project on the basis
of an alleged Save Tara violation).
178. See, e.g., Memorandum of Revised Joint Development Policies and Procedures from
Nelia S. Custodio, Transp. Planning Manager, to the L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. (Oct. 14,
2009),
available
at
http://boardarchives.metro.net/Items/2009/10_October/20091014P&
PItem6.pdf (public agency staff report recommending changes to agency policies regarding
exclusive negotiating agreements to make contingent CEQA compliance more explicit and to
eliminate the checklist requirement for proposed project details).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Memorandum on CEQA Analysis of KBRA and KHSA from Thomas P.
Guarino, Cnty. Counsel, Office of Siskiyou Cnty. Counsel (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.co.siskiyou.ca.us/BOS/DOCS/KBRA/All%20Parties%20and%20Persons_Release%2
0of%20CEQA%20Analysis%2003_17_10%20MEM%20with%20Analysis%20Attached.pdf.
181. Jennifer Hernandez et al., California Appeals Court Offers Guidance on When an
Agency’s Agreement with a Developer Requires Environmental Review Under CEQA, HOLLAND
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potential project approval are unique, and the facts pertaining to the
proposed development of a National Football League (NFL) stadium
in Cedar Fair—a huge, politically advantaged project requiring
years of negotiation between multiple parties—are very different
from the facts typically surrounding smaller, less politically
advantaged projects.182 Given the political and economic momentum
that can build up behind such large projects, the flexibility that the
city retained to modify or reject the stadium project in Cedar Fair
may not have seriously jeopardized the negotiations between the city,
the NFL, and other stakeholders, while similar flexibility that a city
or other public agency retains regarding a smaller project may
threaten the necessary funding or political support for that project.183
Accordingly, Cedar Fair provides guidance to cities and project
applicants for drafting some preliminary agreements that are made
conditional on CEQA compliance. Nevertheless, under Save Tara, a
court may still determine that regardless of such conditional CEQA
compliance language, a preliminary agreement, as a practical matter,
may commit the agency to the project, and would therefore be
subject to environmental review.

& KNIGHT ENV’T. ALERT, 1, 2 (May 17, 2011), http://www.hklaw.com/default.aspx?id=24660&
PublicationId=3121&ReturnId=31&ContentId=55541&pdf=yes.
182. A detailed discussion of the political and economic momentum that can build behind
such large projects is beyond the scope of this Note; however, two recently proposed football
stadiums in Southern California provide relevant examples of this phenomenon. After a CEQA
lawsuit was filed against Majestic Realty’s proposed NFL stadium in the City of Industry, the
developer successfully lobbied state legislators to grant a statutory exemption from any such
CEQA action. Jeremy H. Danney, Comment, Sacking CEQA: How NFL Stadium Developers May
Have Tackled the California Environmental Quality Act, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 143–
45 (2011). Similarly, Anschutz Entertainment Group recently obtained approval of a bill that
would fast-track any CEQA lawsuit filed against its proposed downtown Los Angeles stadium
directly to an appellate court, potentially shortening the CEQA approval process for this project
by years. Los Angeles Football Stadium Plan Gets Boost, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 28, 2011,
10:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/story/2011-09-28/los-angeles-stadiumbill/50583414/1.
183. See Brief for Housing California, supra note 166, at 2. See, e.g., Karen S. Christensen,
The Challenge of Affordable Housing in 21st Century California: Constraints and Opportunities
in the Nonprofit Housing Sector 21–27 (Inst. of Urban & Reg’l Dev., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley,
Working Paper No. 2000-04, 2000), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5bn582sf
(describing the significant funding and timing obstacles facing nonprofit housing developers,
especially those proposing smaller projects).
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V. PROPOSAL
A. Legislative Amendment
of CEQA Guidelines
Given the high costs of CEQA compliance and the even more
burdensome costs of CEQA litigation, the legislature should amend
specific sections of the CEQA Guidelines to reflect the Save Tara
decision and to set forth clearer standards regarding when a project
has been approved. First, the legislature should amend Section
15004(b)(2) of the CEQA Guidelines,184 which purports to set forth
an exception to CEQA for land acquisition agreements that are
conditioned on future CEQA compliance, but which was severely
limited by Save Tara.185 The legislature should move section
15004(b)(2)(A)’s language exempting certain land-acquisition
agreements to the CEQA Guidelines’ definition of “approval,”186 and
broaden the language to reference funding agreements and other
preliminary agreements entered into by a lead agency that constitute
184. Section 15004(b)(2) states:
[P]ublic agencies shall not undertake actions concerning the proposed public project
that would have a significant adverse effect or limit the choice of alternatives or
mitigation measures, before completion of CEQA compliance. For example, agencies
shall not:
(A) Formally make a decision to proceed with the use of a site for facilities which
would require CEQA review, regardless of whether the agency has made any final
purchase of the site for these facilities, except that agencies may designate a preferred
site for CEQA review and may enter into land acquisition agreements when the agency
has conditioned the agency’s future use of the site on CEQA compliance.
(B) Otherwise take any action which gives impetus to a planned or foreseeable project
in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily
be part of CEQA review of that public project.
CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
185. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 357 (Cal. 2008) (“The Guidelines’
exception for land purchases is a reasonable interpretation of CEQA, but it should not swallow
the general rule (reflected in the same regulation) that a development decision having potentially
significant environmental effects must be preceded, not followed, by CEQA review.”).
186. Section 15352 states:
(a) “Approval” means the decision by a public agency which commits the agency to a
definite course of action in regard to a project intended to be carried out by any person.
The exact date of approval of any project is a matter determined by each public agency
according to its rules, regulations, and ordinances. Legislative action in regard to a
project often constitutes approval. (b) With private projects, approval occurs upon the
earliest commitment to issue or the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary
contract, grant, subsidy, loan, or other form of financial assistance, lease, permit,
license, certificate, or other entitlement for use of the project.
tit. 14, § 15352.

320

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:289

specific exceptions from project approvals that trigger CEQA
review.
Additionally, the legislature should amend section 15352’s
definition of approval to more accurately capture the applicable
standard of commitment to a project.187 Currently, subparagraph (a) of
this section purports to grant agencies the discretion of determining
when approval is granted, but the courts have consistently interpreted
this discretion away from agencies when they have determined that
such discretion violates the intent of CEQA. Adding a new
subparagraph (c) to this section that describes approval and
commitment in terms of an agency foreclosing alternatives or
mitigation measures would provide greater guidance to these
agencies.
As a result of these changes, section 15004(b)(2) would continue
to set forth the clear principle that agencies must not “take any
action” that significantly furthers a project “in a manner that
forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily
be part of CEQA review of that public project.”188 Additionally,
section 15352 would now define approval so that informed agencies
and project proponents would understand the limits of their
discretion. Section 15352 would also contain specific exceptions for
land acquisition agreements, funding mechanisms, exclusive
negotiating agreements, and other conditional agreements that are
conditioned on future CEQA compliance, so long as those
agreements do not foreclose any future project alternatives or
mitigation measures.
While these proposed changes to the CEQA Guidelines may
seem minor, they would add valuable CEQA policies that have been
established through court decisions to the Guidelines and therefore
improve the ability of the Guidelines to inform and guide agency and
public action regarding the commencement of environmental review.
Moreover, these low-cost changes would set forth a clearer principle
regarding the timing of environmental review and would better
capture the flexible, fact-specific inquiry that Save Tara requires into
whether a project has been approved.

187. Id.
188. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(b).
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B. Best Practices for Agencies
If agencies have not already done so following Save Tara, they
must review internal policies regarding preliminary agreements,
exclusive negotiating agreements, memoranda of understanding, and
other actions pertaining to predevelopment activities. In revising any
of these policies, agencies should adopt consistent definitions of
“project,” “approval,” and “commitment” that reflect the language of
the CEQA guidelines and the California courts’ interpretations of
these terms. The Cedar Fair decision provides guidance for agencies
regarding these issues.189
Agencies should also establish clear policies stating that initial
feasibility studies of projects, which may be exempt from review
under both CEQA’s statutory language and Save Tara,190 are clearly
distinct from agency commitment to any project. Moreover, agency
staff and officials should temper potential enthusiasm for a proposed
project, because public statements supporting such a project may
indicate an improper commitment prior to CEQA review.191
Following the intact holdings of McCloud and Santee, agencies may
wish to refrain from developing detailed project descriptions as part
of any preliminary feasibility study or conditional agreement. Any
such agreement should not only include a range of alternatives but
also include a clear statement that the agreement does not foreclose
any alternatives or mitigation measures.192 Again, Cedar Fair
provides guidance here.193
A more drastic approach for agencies wishing to seek further
protections from CEQA lawsuits could be to add additional steps in
their customary approval processes. One option would be to require
multiple stages of agency approval for preliminary negotiating and
funding loan agreements.194 Another option would be for agencies to
189. Cedar Fair L.P. v. City of Santa Clara, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667, 679 (Ct. App. 2011).
190. tit 14, § 15262; Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 359.
191. See Arthur Pugsley, Timing Is Everything: Ensuring Meaningful CEQA Review by
Avoiding Improper “Precommitment” to a Project, 2009 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 243, 251 (2009).
192. See City of Santee v. Cnty. of San Diego, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 64 (Ct. App. 2010);
Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Cmty. Servs. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Ct. App.
2007).
193. Cedar Fair, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 680.
194. See, e.g., Memorandum to the City of Sonoma City Council, supra note 174.
Staff was then directed to negotiate an agreement that would enable them to proceed
with conducting neighborhood and community outreach, designing and engineering a
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consider undertaking tiered environmental review for proposed
projects.195 Under such a tiering process, an agency would conduct
initial CEQA review for site selection and alternatives, which could
then be followed by more detailed, site- and project-specific
environmental review after the proponent has determined more
characteristics of the project.196 The court in Save Tara also
suggested that staged EIRs or some other form of tiering may allow
agencies to postpone the evaluation of certain project details that are
not reasonably foreseeable when the agency first approves the
project.197 Of course, tiered environmental analysis involves an early
commitment to preparing an EIR, and many agencies and project
proponents would likely resist these additional costs and potential for
delay. Additionally, while some advocates of a tiering approach
claim that agencies and applicants could potentially enjoy greater
protections from litigation at the end of the CEQA process,198 others
have pointed out that tiering has not reduced the number of
challenges to projects.199
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no easy fix to prevent future litigation over CEQA’s
applicability to agency actions. Legislative amendments to CEQA
project proposal, applying for development review, and completing environmental
review. The proposed Exclusive Negotiating Agreement (ENA) and Predevelopment
Loan would accomplish this direction. However, the ENA and the loan agreement are
also structured to avoid pre-judging the outcome of the planning and environmental
review process. For this reason, if a project is ultimately approved by the Planning
Commission it would then be necessary to enter into a subsequent agreement with
AHA in order to proceed with implementation. The ENA and the Loan Agreement
were prepared by the CDA’s redevelopment counsel who has confirmed that they do
not do not raise the pre-approval issue that was at the heart of the “Save Tara” case.
Id.
195. For a discussion of tiered environmental review as authorized and encouraged by CEQA,
see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 603–10; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21093(b) (West
2007) (“[E]nvironmental impact reports shall be tiered whenever feasible, as determined by the
lead agency.”).
196. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 606.
197. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 361 (Cal. 2008); see also Pugsley,
supra note 191, at 251 (“Before entering any type of agreement on a specific site, the agency
should also strongly consider undertaking tiered environmental review, with an initial CEQA
review for site selection and alternatives, followed by a more detailed, site specific environmental
review when more details about the specific project are known.”).
198. Pugsley, supra note 191, at 251.
199. Rothman, supra note 9, at 15–16.
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are proposed every year, and while minor tweaks along the lines that
this Note suggests may be possible, wholesale revisions are unlikely.
As a result, the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of
“approval” of a project as it set forth in Save Tara will remain in
effect unless the court issues a superseding opinion. However, given
the near certainty of continued litigation around the CEQA timing
issues that are at the heart of Save Tara, further changes to CEQA’s
treatment of project approvals are likely in store.

324

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:289

